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The rise in foreign direct investment and the increasing activity of multinational firms expose 
national corporate tax bases to cross-country profit shifting, but also lead to rising profitability 
of the corporate sector. We incorporate these two effects of economic integration into a 
simple political economy model where the median voter decides on a redistributive income 
tax rate. In this setting economic integration may raise or lower the equilibrium tax rate, 
depending on whether the higher excess burden of the tax or the larger redistributive gains 
from the perspective of the representative worker are the dominant effect. Our simple model 
holds several implications for future empirical work on the relationship between globalization 
and the effective rate of capital taxation. 
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One of the most pronounced trends in the world economy over the last decades has been
the rise in foreign direct investment and multinational activity. In the United States,
for example, foreign pro¯ts made up around 5 per cent of all corporate pro¯ts earned
by U.S. ¯rms until the late 1960s, but this share has meanwhile risen to more than 25
per cent, and is probably even higher (Desai and Hines, 2004). As a consequence of this
development national corporate tax bases have become more sensitive to tax changes.
A particular tax-saving strategy of multinational ¯rms is to shift pro¯t from high-tax to
low-tax countries in which they operate. Empirical evidence is accumulating that ¯rms
do indeed use this opportunity through various channels, such as transfer pricing, the
allocation of overhead costs, and ¯nancial transactions within the multinational ¯rm.1
There is, however, a second factor associated with economic integration and the rise
of multinational ¯rms. This relates to the empirical evidence showing that multinational
¯rms are on average more productive than local ¯rms (see e.g., Barba Navaretti and
Venables, 2004). The di®erence in productivity (and pro¯tability) has been explained
by several factors. At the ¯rm level, pro¯tability may rise due to the ability to utilize
di®erences in international factor prices (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Productivity
growth may also occur at the industry level, however, when ¯rms are heterogeneous
and economic integration reallocates market shares from domestic to multinational ¯rms
(Melitz, 2003). Recent empirical evidence for the U.S. manufacturing industry shows
that economic integration leads to productivity growth both at the ¯rm and at the
industry level (Bernard et al., 2006). Similar evidence is obtained for the United King-
dom, where the shift towards the service sector, and in particular towards the highly
pro¯table banking, ¯nance and insurance branches is one of the factors explaining the
rise in corporate tax revenues over the last two decades (Devereux et al., 2004).
The traditional literature on international tax competition has usually con¯ned its
attention to the increasing mobility of the capital tax base, while taking the distribution
of gross-of-tax factor earnings as given. Therefore, the typical result in tax competition
models is that increasing capital mobility leads governments to undercut each other's
capital income tax rates, resulting in underprovision of public goods as well as relatively
higher taxes on immobile factors (see Wilson, 1999 for a survey). Empirical evidence in
1A large number of studies provide evidence for pro¯t shifting by U.S. multinationals; see Hines
(1999) for a survey of the early literature. An early case study from Germany is Weichenrieder (1996).
More recently, systematic evidence for pro¯t shifting has also been found for European multinationals
(Huizinga and Laeven, 2005). For an up-to-date survey of the empirical literature on ¯rm location and
pro¯t shifting, see Devereux (2006).
1support of this theoretical prediction, however, is mixed. Statutory corporate tax rates
have been signi¯cantly reduced in most OECD countries since the 1980s, but tax bases
have simultaneously been broadened. As a consequence, e®ective tax rates on pro¯ts
have fallen by much less than statutory rates, and in several countries they have not
fallen at all (see Devereux, Gri±th and Klemm, 2002).2
Only recently a literature strand has emerged that studies tax competition in models
of industry agglomeration where economic integration changes the level of rents earned
by imperfectly competitive ¯rms (Kind et al., 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Borck
and P°Ä uger, 2006). These models do not allow for multinational ¯rms and cross-country
pro¯t-shifting, however, but only consider the location decision of single-jurisdictional
¯rms. This leads to a rather rigid determination of optimal tax policy: the core region
always taxes away the excess of pro¯ts that ¯rms can earn in its territory, vis-a-vis the
other (periphery) country. As the model implies that these agglomeration rents will ¯rst
rise and then fall as economic integration proceeds, so will optimal corporate tax rates.
Moreover, analyzing tax competition in models of the \new economic geography" is a
rather complex undertaking and solving the full tax game requires the use of numerical
simulation methods, at least in the realistic case of partial ¯rm agglomeration (Borck
and P°Ä uger, 2006).3
The present short paper pursues a di®erent approach to analyze the e®ects of eco-
nomic integration on optimal redistributive taxation. We set up a highly stylized model
that incorporates, in the simplest possible way, independent e®ects of economic integra-
tion on the pro¯tability of multinational ¯rms and on the ease with which these ¯rms
can shift pro¯ts to low-tax countries. These twin e®ects of economic integration are em-
bedded into a simple political economy model with an internationally mobile pro¯t tax
base. Our stylized model allows us to derive a reduced-form expression for the optimal
redistributive tax rate in the political-economic equilibrium. In this framework global-
ization increases both the redistributive gains, but also the e±ciency costs of taxation
from the perspective of the median voter. Hence economic integration has a fundamen-
2Several econometric analyses exist on this subject. These studies provide some evidence of a negative
relationship between (di®erent measures of) economic integration and the level of corporate taxation if
the latter is measured by statutory or e®ective average tax rates. This relationship, however, is generally
not robust to the precise speci¯cation used in the empirical model and it disappears completely when
tax revenue is used as the dependent variable. See Rodrik (1997), Bretschger and Hettich (2002), Swank
and Steinmo (2002), Slemrod (2004) and Winner (2005).
3A di®erent extension of the standard tax competition model is analyzed by Fuest (2005). In his
model economic integration increases the mobility of the capital tax base, but also raises the share of
foreign ¯rm ownership and thus strengthens the incentive to tax the pro¯ts accruing to foreigners. In
Fuest's model, however, this last e®ect can only dominate the role of increased tax base mobility if
governments can also use import tari®s.
2tally ambiguous e®ect on the redistributive tax rate in the political economy equilibrium.
Finally, we characterize parameter constellations that lead to an increase or a decrease
in the rate of capital taxation.
2 The model
We consider a model of two countries which are linked through both goods and capital
°ows. The home country, on which the analysis is focused, is populated by two types
of individuals, capitalists (index C) and workers (index L). The total population is
normalized to unity. There are ¹ workers and (1 ¡ ¹) capitalists. Workers form the
majority of the population so that 1 > ¹ > 0:5. There is one aggregate consumption
good whose price is normalized to one. It takes one unit of domestic labour to produce
one unit of the numeraire good; competitive market conditions then determine that the
domestic wage rate is also one. Each worker exogenously supplies one unit of labour and
receives a gross wage income of unity. Capitalists instead receive pro¯t income ¼ from
a multinational enterprise (MNE). Pro¯ts are zero if domestic workers are employed in
production. However, positive pro¯ts can be earned by the multinational ¯rm when it
employs workers from the foreign country, which has a lower wage rate W · 1.4 In
a simple way this captures one of the most important motivations for foreign direct
investment, namely to utilize lower factor prices abroad (Helpman and Krugman, 1985).
The home country levies a proportional, comprehensive income tax at rate t on all
wage and pro¯t income. The labour tax base is internationally immobile, whereas the
pro¯t tax base is responsive to tax di®erentials between the home and foreign countries.
Hence capitalists face two decisions in our model: they choose (i) how much to produce
abroad and (ii) how much pro¯ts to shift to the foreign country. Both of these decisions
have been extensively discussed in the literature. We incorporate them here in a highly
stylized way, in order to keep our argument as simple as possible.
We ¯rst turn to the decision on how much output the home-owned ¯rm produces in
the foreign country. While the labour input is cheaper, producing abroad adds extra
transport costs for the ¯rm. Transport costs are interpreted in a wide sense, including
administrative hurdles and information costs. We model these costs as being convex in
the volume of foreign production, re°ecting, for example, increasing marginal monitoring
costs when larger parts of production are outsourced.5 For simplicity we specify quadratic
4Such di®erences in unit labour costs could be due, for example, to the existence of trade unions in
the home country.
5This is in line with some of the ¯ndings in the new theory of the multinational ¯rm (see Marin and
Verdier, 2003).
3transport costs of the form ± = X2=(2®), where X is the volume of foreign production
and 1=® is a transport cost parameter. We interpret the inverse of the transport cost
parameter, ®, as a measure of economic integration. Increasing economic integration (an
increase in ®) will reduce the transaction costs for foreign direct investment, for example
by reducing the communication costs within the MNE. With these speci¯cations the
¯rm's before-tax pro¯ts are given by




All pro¯ts are taxable in the home country. However, the capitalist is able to shift
some of the pro¯ts abroad, either through transfer pricing or by using tax-e±cient ¯-
nancing structures.6 Let ¯ be the share of pro¯ts that is transferred abroad in this way
and denote the foreign tax rate by T. As in the case of the ¯rm's production decisions
it is costly to engage in pro¯t shifting activities and the deadweight costs are convex in
the share of pro¯ts transferred abroad. Hence, by analogy to the transportation costs in-
curred when the ¯rm produces abroad, the real resources spent when transferring pro¯ts









where ¼ is given in (1). Hence in our model the ¯rm's output decision (X) is separated
from the decision on pro¯t shifting.7
From (1) the capitalist maximizes pro¯ts by choosing
X = ® (1 ¡ W) ´ ® ¢W ; (3)
where we have introduced ¢W as a short-hand notation for the exogenous international
wage di®erential. From (3) the level of output produced abroad is a rising function of
the unit wage di®erential and of the degree of economic integration.
Similarly, deriving the optimal level of ¯ from (2) and ruling out that the domestic
¯rm declares more pro¯ts in the home country than it earns gives
¯ = maxf® (t ¡ T);0g : (4)
6Income can be shifted through borrowing and lending between the multinational's a±liates, be-
cause the interest paid on this internal loan is taxable in the lending country, but tax-deductible in
the borrowing country. See Mintz and Smart (2004) for a detailed modelling of this tax avoidance
mechanism.
7It should be emphasized that this simpli¯cation results from the speci¯cation of the transaction
cost functions ± and ". With more general speci¯cations, the output and pro¯t shifting decisions will
interact. This interaction, however, signi¯cantly complicates the analysis without yielding qualitatively
di®erent results for the main issue under analysis. The separation of output and pro¯t-shifting decisions
is a common assumption in the literature; see Gresik (2001) for a survey.
4Hence the share of pro¯ts shifted abroad depends positively on the di®erential between
the home and the foreign tax rates (if this di®erential is positive), and again on the
integration measure ®.







It follows from (4) and (5) that economic integration (a rise in ®) will raise the gross
pro¯ts of the multinational ¯rm, but at the same time increases the share of pro¯ts that
is shifted abroad.
3 Tax equilibrium and economic integration
Tax policy in the home country is determined by the median voter. Given the assump-
tions on the distribution of the population, this individual is a representative worker
who derives utility from the aggregate consumption good and a quasi-private public
good. Both the private and the public good enter the workers's utility function linearly.8
Hence the representative worker's utility function is uL = (1 ¡ t) + °r; where r is total
(and per-capita) tax revenue collected. The constant marginal bene¯t of the public good
is ° < 1, implying that the worker su®ers a utility loss when one unit of her private
consumption is exchanged for one unit of the public good.
The proportional income tax falls on wage income and on the share of pro¯t income
that the capitalist reports in the home country. Using the optimal tax avoidance de-
cision (4), total and per capita tax revenues are r = tf¹ + (1 ¡ ¹)¼ [1 ¡ ® (t ¡ T)]g.
Hence the utility of the representative worker in the home country is
u
L = (1 ¡ t) + °tf¹ + (1 ¡ ¹)¼
¤ [1 ¡ ® (t ¡ T)]g: (6)
The equilibrium policy maximizes uL with respect to the proportional income tax t.
This yields the home country's best response function
t(T) =
° [¹ + (1 ¡ ¹)¼¤(1 + ® T)] ¡ 1
2® ° (1 ¡ ¹) ¼¤ : (7)
It is directly inferred from (7) that this function is upward-sloping.
Tax policy in the foreign country is modelled in the simplest possible way. We assume
that the foreign country maximizes tax revenues from the pro¯ts of the multinational
8A well-de¯ned optimal tax rate is obtained in our model, despite the linearity of the objective
function in both arguments, because the excess burden of taxation is strictly convex in the tax rate.






which implies that the foreign country has the lower tax rate in the non-cooperative tax
equilibrium.




2f° [¹ + (1 ¡ ¹)¼¤] ¡ 1g
3®°(1 ¡ ¹)¼¤ ; (9)
where ¼¤ is given in (5). The equilibrium tax rate is rising in the preference parameter
for public goods (°). It is positive, if the value of additional units of the public good that
is ¯nanced by the tax contributions of the capitalist, °(1¡¹)¼¤, exceeds the utility loss
for the worker from being taxed herself (°¹ ¡ 1 < 0). This is assumed in what follows.
It can then be directly inferred from (9) that the home country's Nash equilibrium tax
rate will rise, if the equilibrium level of gross pro¯ts (¼¤) is increased.
The core issue underlying our analysis is whether economic integration, as described
by an increase in the parameter ®, leads to an increase or a reduction in the home
country's equilibrium tax rate. From (8) this will also induce a foreign tax change















There are two counteracting e®ects in equation (10). The ¯rst term is unambiguously
negative, if the equilibrium tax rate (9) is positive. This e®ect captures the increased
e±ciency costs of redistributive taxation when economic integration makes the domestic
pro¯t tax base more mobile internationally and increases pro¯t-shifting to the low-tax
country. The second e®ect is positive, however, as 1¡°¹ > 0 and d¼¤=d® > 0 is implied
by (5). This e®ect describes the additional redistributive gains from the income tax
when economic integration raises the pro¯ts of the multinational ¯rm. Depending on
which of the two e®ects dominates, economic integration may thus either raise or lower
the redistributive tax rate chosen by the median voter.9
9Note the di®erence between our results and those derived in political economy models of strategic
delegation (Persson and Tabellini, 1992; Gottschalk and Peters, 2003). In these models the working
majority is able to mitigate the downward pressure on capital tax rates by delegating decisions to
6To link the two counteracting e®ects in (10) to observable country characteristics
we use the gross pro¯t expression (5) and substitute the home and the foreign coun-
tries' equilibrium taxes from (8) and (9). The e®ects of economic integration can then




¡(T ¤ ¡ 2t¤)
2®
+
(1 ¡ ¹°) (¢W)2
3®°(1 ¡ ¹)¼2 : (11)
Hence the increased sensitivity of the tax base will be the dominant e®ect of eco-
nomic integration, if the international tax di®erential is large and thus the motive for
international pro¯t shifting is strong. In contrast, if the international wage di®erential
is large, then economic integration will lead to a substantial increase in the pro¯ts of
multinational ¯rms. From the perspective of the median voter, the redistributive gains
from an income tax increase may then exceed the additional e±ciency losses. Our results
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Economic integration tends to increase (decrease) the redistributive in-
come tax rate, if (i) the equilibrium tax di®erential between the home and the foreign
country is small (large); and (ii) the wage di®erential between the domestic and the
foreign country is large (small).
4 Conclusion
This paper has started from two well-known e®ects that are associated with the rise
in foreign direct investment and multinational ¯rm activity. In contrast to nationally
operating ¯rms, MNEs have the opportunity to shift pro¯ts to low-tax countries,but
they are also more pro¯table and thus raise the aggregate pro¯tability in the corporate
sector. Incorporating these facts into a simple political economy model we have shown
that economic integration (a rise in the market share of multinational ¯rms) increases the
e±ciency cost of capital taxation, but it also increases the redistributive bene¯ts of the
tax from the perspective of the median voter. As a consequence the relationship between
the degree of economic integration and the redistributive income tax rate chosen by the
representative worker is fundamentally ambiguous. This ambiguity is also the main
justi¯cation for the modelling approach that we have followed. If a simple model like
the one used here does not lead to a clear-cut relationship between economic integration
and the level of redistributive taxation, then neither will a more complex one.
politicians that prefer a larger degree of redistribution than the median voter herself. Nevertheless, the
only direct e®ect of economic integration is increased tax base mobility. As a consequence economic
integration leads, in equilibrium, to an unambiguous decline in the level of redistributive taxation.
7Our ¯nding may provide an explanation for the contrast between the clear theoretical
prediction of falling tax rates that are derived in much of the literature on capital tax
competition, and the rather mixed evidence found in empirical studies. In fact, existing
studies may even overstate the negative relationship between globalization and the rate
of capital taxation, because they typically focus only on taxes at the company level. If
taxes at the shareholder level are also taken into account, this downward trend becomes
even less clear in many countries. For example the German corporate tax reform of 2000
signi¯cantly reduced the federal corporate tax rate from 42 to 25 percent, but simulta-
neously ended the full crediting of the corporation tax against the personal income tax
of German shareholders. Another case in point is Norway, which reduced the statutory
corporate tax rate from 50.5 percent to 28 percent in 1992. The Norwegian tax reform
of 2004 maintained this tax rate for undistributed company pro¯ts, but ended the zero
taxation of dividends and subjected all dividend income exceeding a computed risk-free
return on the investment to double taxation. The mandate that the Norwegian tax com-
mittee had was explicitly to narrow down the tax di®erential between capital taxes and
wage taxes that had formed after the tax reform of 1992, and which had caused rising
tensions in society from a redistributive point of view.10
In sum, despite large reductions in statutory corporate tax rates, the combined e®ects
of the reforms in Germany and Norway implied that the e®ective tax burden on individual
capital income - incorporating both the corporation tax and the individual income tax -
fell only slightly, if at all. To fully account for these developments, a more detailed model
would have to be set up, where the government disposes of separate tax instruments at
the company level and at the level of shareholders. However, our simple model is able to
explain the small net e®ect on the overall e®ective capital tax rate as the result of two
counteracting forces caused by economic integration.
Our analysis holds several testable implications for future work on the empirical
relationship between economic integration and the e®ective rate of capital taxation.
First, it implies that corporate tax revenue (as a percentage of GDP) is not a suitable
measure for the e®ective tax rate, as this measure includes the e®ects of rising ¯rm
pro¯tability. This conforms with the empirical results of Slemrod (2004) and earlier
studies discussed in Bretschger and Hettich (2002) and Swank and Steinmo (2002), who
do not ¯nd any negative, and in some cases they even ¯nd a positive relationship between
economic integration and corporate tax revenue. Second, from the discussion above, a
broader measure for the e®ective rate of capital taxation would be desirable that includes
10A detailed explanation for the mandate and the reform can be found at
http://odin.dep.no/¯n/english/topics/p4500279/reform/006071-230126/dok-bn.html
8taxes levied at the shareholder level. Such a measure would be able to capture o®setting
tax changes at the company level and at the level of individual shareholders. Finally,
to isolate the e®ect that economic integration has on the international mobility of the
capital tax base, the level of pre-tax pro¯tability of ¯rms needs to be controlled for. Only
then would we expect to ¯nd a robustly negative e®ect of economic integration on the
e®ective rate of capital taxation.
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